Complete List of Errors and Typos found in the First Print run/edition of
Art as Communication: Aesthetics, Evolution, and Signaling by Shawn Simpson

Page 2. End of line 1, start of line 2. It reads:

nin-thcentury

It should instead read:

ninth century.

Page 14. Last paragraph. Line 2. It reads:

Here, a work of art is NEVER actually viewed

It should instead read:

Here, a work of art is *never* actually viewed

Note: I think the printing/typesetting program must have had some error that changed the italics to all capital letters.

Page 15. Line 22. It reads:

with *the intention* that it be

It should instead read:

with the *intention* that it be

Page 16. Last paragraph. Line 4. It reads:

"*Rabbit in a Snowstorm"*

It should instead read:

Rabbit in a Snowstorm

Page 50. Bottom line of the page. The endnote reads 56 but should indicate endnotes 5 and 6. So, a space needs to be added between the two numbers.

Page 57. There should be a footnote at the end of the paragraph that starts with "Again, the way to think" and ends with "model centers around." This is the paragraph right after the large quote. Without this citation, the section gives off the appearance that this is my own original idea and yet it is not. The footnote should read:

See Godfrey-Smith (2013b) for an introduction to the *paradigm vs. marginal* strategy for handling the sender-receiver model.

Pages 58-60:

Notes for publisher/editor: This section needs to be replaced as it presents a serious mis-representation of the views of Ronald Planer and Peter Godfrey-Smith. There should also be a new footnote/endnote added at the end of this edited section after the final instance of the word "here" in the last sentence of the final paragraph. Here is the start of the new version of this section:

A recent attempt at an explication is due to philosophers Ronald Planer and Godfrey-Smith.[28] They suggest that what is important when we consider the question of syntax in signaling systems is a pair of three-way distinctions. They distinguish between *nominal*, *organized*, and *encoding* signals, and signals that are *atomic*, *composite*, and *combinatorial*. *Atomic* signals are simply solo signals. So, consider the signals in the Deep Throat case. There are no parts to them. It is not the case that, say, the color of the pot combined with the pot's location determines its meaning – it's just the location that matters. *Composite* signals are signals that have more than one part. So, for example, the AB signal as opposed to an A signal; the pot's location *plus* the pot's color. A *combinatorial* signal is one where, the "order," "sequence properties," or some other sort of relationship matters – so, for example, the order of AB mattering and resulting in a different meaning than the signal BA. *Nominal* signals are ones where there is no role for the relationship that a signal might have to other signals – so consider a case where Woodward just happens to put the potted plant *closer to* or *farther from* one side of the balcony the more or less urgently he needs to meet but where the sender and receiver simply don't notice or make use of that correlation. An *organized* system is one where such a relationship *is* used by the signalers. What an encoded system is is harder to pin down. Planer and Godfrey-Smith write: "When combinatorial signs have their meaning specified by an encoding principle that gives a semantic role to the sequence properties of signs, we have syntax."[29] They also write that what matters is a "relation-between-relations", but this too is left unclarified. The two examples of encoded signals they discuss are binary code and a particular kind of animal alarm call. In the binary case, part of what's key is the sequence – the order in a list of 1s and 0s. In the alarm call case, however, there is no sequence of that kind. Instead, what matters is simply the mapping of signal parts systematically to some other relationship – the distance of the predator to the decibel level of the call: the louder the call, the closer the predator. In Planer's paper, he says that what matters is a "pattern" in the way states are mapped to signs, and that where the mapping is "completely haphazard" there is no encoding.

I have several worries about this analysis. First, it's not clear why "completely" in "completely haphazard" is important here – how haphazard can a mapping be and still count as encoding (as opposed to organized) according to their analysis? I don't know, and they don't say. Second, as I said, they don't really spell out exactly what they mean by "sequence" here, and their analysis doesn't make clear why a "sequence" or what kind of "pattern" is really necessary. Consider the Woodward case again. Suppose Woodward made it so that not only did the pot's location tell Deep Throat that he needed to meet or not but that the *color* of the pot corresponded to how soon Woodward needed to meet. Then there is a "sequence" of sorts (what I'll call a "sequential pattern") in how soon Woodward possibly needs to meet – from sooner to later – but there need be no corresponding sequential pattern mirrored in the possible signal colors. Compare this to an alarm call case where there is a sequential pattern utilized in the calls –

the decibel levels – *and* present in the world – the various distances of the predator. There would be a sequential pattern of sorts in the Woodward signal if it were the distance of the pot from one side of the balcony that corresponded to the urgency of needing to meet. Then we have a sequential pattern that can be useful for receivers when it comes to predicting what, say, a potted plant of distance *D* from one side of the balcony means. Consider also the case where Woodward uses the color of the pot to indicate something other than some sort of sequential pattern (to be clear: by "sequential pattern" I mean something that comes on a scale or spectrum – properties like distance, time, weight, etc.). Suppose Woodward uses the color of the pot to mean he wants to meet at the garage of that color. Here there doesn't seem to be a sequential pattern in the nature of the signs – the distance of the signs, their decibel level, etc. – but there is still some sort of systematic mapping – from color to color.[30] We can even imagine Woodward using a yellow pot to mean the red garage (which in the real world might be a good idea for someone engaging in covert activity). I suggest interpreting encoding broadly to include cases such as these too.

Now consider *composite-encoded* signals. Why must order or sequence matter for something to count as a case of syntax? Suppose A means "Lion" and 1 means "1 foot away" and so A1 means "Lion one foot away". This case has a systematic mapping of signal parts to other properties, has a "relation-between-relations", but it could also be such that 1A means the same thing. It's not obvious why a language that operated this way should not also be described as having a syntax. Some analyses of Latin suggest that that language works in this manner, that order doesn't matter – though, others disagree.[31] In any case, it doesn't seem impossible to imagine a human language that would work in this way. And it seems somewhat arbitrary to set such cases aside as cases of language without syntax.

There's more. Planer points out that in the case of binary, the order matters, but there are not unique atomic signals mapped to unique things in the world. 1s and 0s are all there is in a binary string, and they are reused *within* and *across* signals. So, compare 100010110 having a different meaning from 101111110 and the order mattering and ABCDEFGHIJ having a different meaning than ABCJIHGFE, where in the letter example the individual atomic parts are not being reused *within* the combinatorial signal – A and B only appear once. Both kinds of signals can have mappings from parts to meanings, but only one reuses signals in more than one way and determines their meaning in some instance in part also by their place in the sequence. Planer points out that something similar but slightly different happens in natural language. The word *he* has a certain meaning in "Spencer told Daniel he went to the store" and that meaning is different when used in the sentence "Daniel told Spencer he went to the store." Of course, there is also something that is somewhat the same in the meaning of *he* in both cases – it has the sense of being about a man or refers to the person whose name precedes it.[32] But compare this to the sentence "Connor likes jazz" where the order doesn't seem to play a role in specifying the meaning of the parts in the same way. Planer suggests we extend combinatorial encoded signals to fit these cases where order can have a role in determining individual part meanings. I'll add a slightly different case that I think should be include as well. Consider the sentence "I went to the store." Here, word order matters, and the parts map to specific meanings, but the meaning of *I* changes (in the sense of its referent) depending not on what other words appear before it, its place in the order, as in the Spencer and Daniel case or the binary case, but on *who* sends the signal. Probably there are other examples out there that stretch the boundaries and expand the category, but I won't try to mention them all here.

The new footnote/endnote to be added at the end of "but I won't try to mention them all here": Planer and Godfrey-Smith (2021) acknowledge that *nominal* and *atomic* might not be such distinct categories yet treat them as such anyway. I am more cautious. To some extent, I follow Millikan (1984), who suggests that a sort of structure just is present and acted upon by signalers in some otherwise apparently atomic signals. I treat the alarm call case where agents make use of the decibel levels, for example, as being other than atomic, as being a case of a *composite* signal – the decibel level just is a *part* of the signal and not some "detached" feature of it as Planer and Godfrey-Smith seem to suggest. In response to a similar case, one involving *time* being relevant to a signal's interpretation, Planer and Godfrey-Smith write, "This puts pressure on the nominal category of our classification, though not on the atomic category, as time of production is not a physical part of the call" (p. 13). In short, I think this may be the right move in some cases but wrong in others, and I believe that the way we talk about cases such as the one involving the decibel levels bears this out.

Page 60 (#2). The second and third paragraphs read:

I'll consider one more reason I think the reliance on "order" and "sequence" is problematic. I'll expand on this idea in chapters 4 and 6 when I talk about art and maps. Consider something like a grid system. A simple example is a 2×2 grid. As we saw, a signal such as ABCD can be encoded and compositional. The order can matter, and it can be that each atomic part has a certain meaning it maps to in a systematic way. But a grid system can do something similar. (See figure 2.6.)

The grid from figure 2.6a can have a meaning different than the grid from figure 2.6b, and it can be that the meaning is not just a matter of combination but also composition yet where in this case composition is extended to mean the "arrangement" (for lack of better words) of the parts in a two-dimensional sense, not just in a one- dimensional sense—that is, in the sense of from left to right, in the sense of a place in a sequence like the 1s and the 0s. "Order" just seems like the wrong word to use in the grid case. And we can further imagine that the hue of the squares matters too. It might be that the hues map in a systematic way to certain meanings, in which case the grid from figure 2.6a will have a content different than that from figure 2.6c despite having the same colors in the same arrangement. I can even imagine this sort of situation being expanded further to include three-dimensional examples and possibly more.

They should instead read:

I'll consider one more reason I think the reliance on "order" and "sequence" is problematic. I'll expand on this idea in chapters 4 and 6 when I talk about art and maps. Consider something like a grid system. A simple example is a 2×2 grid. As we saw, a signal such as ABCD can be encoded and combinatorial. The order can matter, and it can be that each atomic part has a certain meaning it maps to in a systematic way. But a grid system can do something similar. (See figure 2.6.)

The grid from figure 2.6a can have a meaning different than the grid from figure 2.6b, and it can be that the meaning is a matter of combinatorial structure and encoding yet where in this case combinatorial structure is extended to include the "arrangement" (for lack of better words) of the parts in a two-dimensional sense, not just in a one-dimensional sense – that is, in the sense of from left to right, in the sense of a place in a sequence like the 1s and the 0s. "Order" just seems like the wrong word to use in the grid case. And we can further imagine that the hue of the squares matters too. It might be that the hues map in a systematic way to certain meanings, in which case the grid from figure 2.6a will have a content different than that from figure 2.6c despite having the same colors in the same arrangement. I can even imagine this sort of situation being expanded further to include three-dimensional examples and possibly more.

Page 71. The example that reads:

> *Green* means "go" or The word *Hola* means "hello."

This example sentence should be centered rather than merely indented.

Page 79. The two instances of "combinatorial" in the first full paragraph should be replaced with "composite"

So, when corrected, the two relevant sentences should read:

> "Now, when a signal is sent, it might have a composite nature: one part original signal (some part of English, say), one part added sarcasm."
>
> "From the point of view of the sender-receiver model, this composite signal could be considered a single larger signal in…"

Page 85. Line 20. It reads:

> Hunter 10, Elk 90%

It should instead read:

> Hunter 10**%**, Elk 90%

Page 85. Figure 2.9. This figure was larger in the original manuscript and appears extremely small in the printed text – so small that a colleague complained about readability. My instructions were for figures 2.9 and 2.10 to be the same size and to be the same size as figure 2.8. I also instructed the proof editor to make all these text-based figures (2.8, 2.9, and 2.10) the same size as the rest of the text in the main body of the book. It looks like they made figures 2.9 and 2.10 the same size but did not make them the same size as 2.8, and they did not make any of the three figures the same size as the text – 2.8 is larger than the main body text and 2.9 and 2.10 are smaller than the main body text.

$$<[P_{sig}(E_1)/P(E_1)], [P_{sig}(H_2)/P(H_2)]>$$

Page 86. Figure 2.10. Same issue as above:

$$[P_{sig}(\text{state 1}), P_{sig}(\text{state 2})]$$

Page 87. There is a mischaracterization of Kim Sterelny's view. Here is the corrected version that should replace it in the revised edition of the book:

> In *Thought in a Hostile World* (2003), Australian philosopher Kim Sterelny articulates a related view in different terms. He introduces the Simple Coordination Hypothesis, according to which early cognitive systems evolved primarily to coordinate action, and he argues against the idea that there is a single naturalistic property that meaning or content is grounded in. Like Sterelny, I do not think that such a key property, or anything like it, is to be found.

Page 89. Line 29. It reads:

> Jeffrey Barrett at the University of California, Riverside

It should instead read:

> Jeffrey Barrett at the University of California, Irvine

Note: Barrett is at UC Irvine – not at UC Riverside. This is a factual error. This was also pointed out to the proof editor and corrected in one version of the proof I saw – I double checked this when we were working on it. Not sure how it changed back as I was very clear about this one.

Page 95. Footnote #30 reads:

> Cases such as these too could be helpful for predicting the meaning of not yet encountered signals in a way similar to the sequence mapping cases.

It should instead read:

> Cases such as these too could be helpful for predicting the meaning of not yet encountered signals in a way similar to the sequential pattern mapping cases.

Page 101. Lines 13-14 read:

> Should it be taken literally, even sometimes – can and do *groups* such as hip-hop duos, ballet companies, and nation-states – and not just the individuals that make them up – *really* issue and receive signals?

I believe this is ungrammatical and impedes readability. It should instead read:

> Should it be taken literally, even sometimes? Can and do *groups* such as hip-hop duos, ballet companies, and nation-states – and not just the individuals that make them up – *really* issue and receive signals?

Page 115. Line 27. The colon in the following sentence should be replaced with a period:

> My answer is this: As I've already suggested, I think group behavior comes in *degrees* or on a sort of *spectrum.*

It should instead look like this:

> My answer is this. As I've already suggested, I think group behavior comes in *degrees* or on a sort of *spectrum.*

Page 130. Line 8 reads:

> On the sender-receiver model, what's important is the co-evolution of sender and receiver communicative behaviors, and rules for sending and acting upon signals.

As is, this is ungrammatical and confusing. It should instead read:

> On the sender-receiver model, what's important is the co-evolution of sender and receiver communicative behaviors – the rules for sending and acting upon signals.

Page 130. Line 13 reads:

> to show that it's *at least possible* that some

It should instead read:

> to show that it's at least *possible* that some

Page 132. The second paragraph has a factual error. It reads:

> *The Garden of Early Delights*

It should instead read:

> *The Garden of Earthly Delights*

Pages 140-141. Starting at the last paragraph of page 140. It reads:

> Consider again the Easter Island drawings. These seem to have a fairly obvious sort of structure. There are parts, and the parts (or some of them) map fairly systematically to parts of the real world. Where the monuments are drawn relative to the shore matters; *arrangement* matters. The shading of the objects in the paintings corresponds systematically to the lighting of the world. What we seem to have is an *encoded combinatorial* signal.

It should instead read:

> Consider again the Easter Island paintings. These seem to have a fairly obvious sort of structure. There are parts, and the parts (or some of them) map fairly systematically to parts of the real world. Where the monuments are painted relative to the shore matters – *arrangement* matters. The shading of the objects in the paintings corresponds systematically to the lighting of the world. What we seem to have is an *encoded combinatorial* (minimally *organized*) signal.

Note: this is a factual error as these works are *paintings* – not drawings. It also includes a grammatical error (the use of a semi-colon) that I did not make in my draft and that comes across as very odd when reading.

Page 142. Line 18. It reads:

> female sheep (a ewe)

It should read instead:

> female sheep (an ewe)

Page 143. First sentence of the second full paragraph reads:

Tsevhu is effectively a combination of a phonological system and positional encoding. And the language is complicated enough to fit our description of an *encoded combinatorial* signal – the parts have systematic mappings, the arrangement and combination of parts matter, and sequences of various sorts can be represented.

It should instead read:

Tsevhu is effectively a combination of a phonological system and positional encoding. And the language is complicated enough to fit our description of an *encoded combinatorial* signal – the parts have systematic mappings, the arrangement and combination of parts matters, and sequential patterns of various sorts can be represented.

Page 151. Second and third full paragraph read:

Add on to that the order, the sequence, in which things happen in this song is important—as is the case with many other songs—and we seem to have an example of a song that is *encoded* and *compositional*. We seem to have a case of a song that fits many of the markers researchers care about when they talk about syntax and language.

Of course, in the case of *Peter and the Wolf*, the music has a more *explicit*, structured signaling function. It was intended to convey information in this systematic and organized way.

It should instead read:

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Of course, in the case of *Peter and the Wolf*, the music has a more *explicit*, structured signaling function. It was intended to convey information in this systematic and combinatorial way.

Page 152. First and second paragraph read:

What we get is a song that seems to be a case of an *encoded compositional* or at the very least, an *encoded combinatorial* signal and not one that is so, for lack of better words, explicit in its structuring as the *Peter and the Wolf* case.[33]

In short, a sort of syntax seems to be possible in music as in spoken and written language. Some cases will be *encoded* and *compositional* like supposedly paradigm cases of language. Many cases, however, I think, will probably fall closer to something like an *organized combinatorial* signal, or an *encoded combinatorial* one.

It should instead read:

What we get is a song that seems to be a case of an *encoded combinatorial* or at the very least, an *organized compositional* signal and not one that is so, for lack of better words, explicit in its structuring as the *Peter and the Wolf* case.[33]

In short, a sort of syntax seems to be possible in music as in spoken and written language. Some cases will be *encoded* and *combinatorial* like supposedly paradigm cases of language. Many cases, however, I think, will probably fall closer to something like an *organized combinatorial* signal.

Page 155. First paragraph, last line reads:

Here, it seems we also find a case of an *encoded compositional* signal.

It should instead read:

Here, it seems we also find a case of an *encoded combinatorial* signal.

Page 157. First paragraph, second to last line reads:

Either way, what we appear to get here is not just a case of a dance being communicative, but of dancing having an *encoded compositional* structure.

It should instead read:

Either way, what we appear to get here is not just a case of a dance being communicative, but of dancing having an *encoded combinatorial* structure.

Page 162. Line 125. Correction: "she" should be “he”.
Note: This is a factual error as Rainer Wehinger is a *man* – not a woman.

Page 163. First paragraph, first sentence reads:

The bottom most row is the thickest string, the row second row to the bottom corresponds to the second thickest string, and so on.

It should instead read:

The bottom most row is the thickest string, the row second to the bottom corresponds to the second thickest string, and so on.

Page 163. First paragraph, 6^{th}, 7^{th}, and 8^{th} sentences read:

The numbers on a tab, and which row they are on, represent which string and how it should be played – open or on a particular fret. Another sequence. And then we have the numbers arranged in order of when they are supposed to be played relative to the other notes. Another (temporal) sequence.

It should instead read:

The numbers on a tab, and which row they are on, represent which string and how it should be played – open or on a particular fret. A sort of sequential mapping. Numbers are also arranged in order of when they are supposed to be played relative to the other notes. A (temporal) sequence.

Page 164. Last sentence of the first paragraph reads:

Again, we seem to get examples of signals that are *compositional* and *encoded* and that seem to take advantage of some similarity between the way things are arranged in the signal and how they are arranged in the target domain, some part of the world.

It should instead read:

Again, we seem to get examples of signals that are *combinatorial* and *encoded* and that seem to take advantage of some similarity between the way things are arranged in the signal and how they are arranged in the target domain, some part of the world.

Page 166. Line 16. It reads:

Martin Luther King Junior

Per the Chicago style guide, it should instead read:

Martin Luther King, Jr.

Page 166 (#2). First paragraph, last line reads:

We get an *encoded compositional* structure, and, more than that, a three-dimensional one.

It should instead read:

We get an *encoded combinatorial* structure, and, more than that, a three-dimensional one.

Page 169. Line 25. It reads:

Or the statue of Christopher Columbus in New York City.

It should instead read:

Or consider the statue of Christopher Columbus in New York City.

Page 194. Lines 5-6. It reads:

> It's worth noting that Miller also tends to focus on modern music for his examples on rock music and jazz.

It should instead read:

> It's worth noting that Miller also tends to focus on modern music for his examples – on rock music and jazz.

Page 194. Line 14. It reads:

> whereas a male can produce many more children by different women in that

It should instead read:

> whereas a male can produce many more children by different females in that

Page 194. Line 36. It reads:

> The importance is in the *placemen*t due to the *difficulty* involved in making the artwork

The 't' in "placement" should also be italicized.

Page 195. Lines 4-7. It reads:

> Such art won't be viewable or experiential by a mate, or won't be attributable, and so won't be able to directly attract a mate or communicate to a mate the sender's fitness.

This makes no sense, especially the word "experiential". It should read instead:

> Such art won't be capable of being experienced by a mate, or won't be attributable to the artist, and so won't be able to directly attract a mate or communicate to a mate the sender's fitness.

Page 196. 3rd paragraph. It reads:

> Stephen Davies, on the other hand, is an example of someone who has doubted the possibility of a group-level evolutionary story for art, seeing any group-level explanation as rather weak one.

There should be an "a" in front of "rather". It should instead read:

> Stephen Davies, on the other hand, is an example of someone who has doubted the possibility of a group-level evolutionary story for art, seeing any group-level explanation as a rather weak one.

Page 200. There is a mischaracterization of Prum's view. Prum thinks that art is something that is evaluated, in particular for its beauty. But he does not think that that beauty is a stand-in for sexual fitness and "good genes" – that is Miller and Dutton's view. Prum doesn't deny that aesthetic preferences might originate from natural selection pressures, but he insists that once they exist, they can take on a life of their own – evolving independently of fitness correlations. That's why he calls his theory "aesthetic evolution by mate choice" – a process that operates alongside natural selection but isn't reducible to it.

Here is the revised version of that part of the paragraph for the new edition:

> If art is sometimes communicative, is it sometimes produced at the non-human level? Richard Prum thinks that some animals make art. Recall that, on his view, art is something that is *evaluated*. More precisely, for Prum, a work of art is evaluated for its *beauty*. Some theorists take beauty to be a reliable indicator of an artist's sexual fitness, that is, their having "good genes." But would something produced by an animal that fits such an account really count as art?

Page 202. Paragraph 2. The instance of "looks" should be replaced with "look" – as bellow:

> An interesting difference between these cases of art and art made by humans appears to be that the works made by bowerbirds and pufferfish all look roughly the same

Page 205. Third paragraph. Second sentence. There should be an "s" at the end of "whale" so that "whale" is instead "whales" – as below:

> The structure of the songs of humpback whales appears rather complex, involving repeated patterns of vocalizations often described as "themes" and "verses."

Pages 208-209. The last sentence of 208 and first of 209. It reads:

> Other males in the group, however, also have a non-zero probability of catching a break and getting a chance to mate – a probability that is higher if one is part of such a group than not; and if the lead bird for whatever reason, vacates his position, one of the group members will assume the lead role.

This should instead read:

> Other males in the group, however, also have a non-zero probability of catching a break and getting a chance to mate – a probability that is higher if one is part of such a group than not. Furthermore, if the lead bird for any reason vacates his position, one of the group members will assume the lead role.

Page 228. Second paragraph, line 9-12. It reads:

> But what really seems to be going on is that the ordering of numbers is being mapped onto the various depths in a systematic and *sequential* way.[18] It's possible Camp could have something like this in mind when she's talking about isomorphism— this stronger sequential form of it being involved. Think about the blue on a map indicating the sea. Sometimes to indicate a greater depth, the shading is made darker on that part of the map. This is like the Woodward case, where the size of the potted plant maps to how soon he needs to meet.

This should instead read:

> But what really seems to be going on is that the ordering of numbers is being mapped onto the various depths in a systematic, sequentially patterned way.[18] It's possible Camp could have something like this in mind when she's talking about isomorphism— this stronger sequentially patterned form of it being involved. Think about the blue on a map indicating the sea. Sometimes to indicate a greater depth, the shading is made darker on that part of the map. This is like the Woodward case, where the distance of the potted plant maps to how soon he needs to meet.

Page 229. First and second paragraph. It reads:

> Now let's take a step back and look at the big picture. What we get is rather interesting. Recalling some of our other lessons from chapter 2, maps, it seems, can be and often are *combinatorial*, and not just that but *compositional* and *encoded* too – just like many other signals. This seems to be part of how they work. Recall the color grid system example from our discussion of syntax in chapter 2 (figure 2.6). Many maps seem to be just much more complicated grid cases. And yet, maps need not always adhere strictly to any sort of "sequence." Again, the water can be red. The elevations reversed or mixed. The shading conventions reversed or jumbled.
>
> Why might maps tend to make use of sequences as well as iconic representation and the systematization of things like icons and their referents? As I suggested earlier, one answer, or part could be that senders were predisposed to make maps that way for whatever reason. But another answer could be that these ways of making maps make interpretation easier for map users (like us, at least). Iconic interpretation can make things fairly obvious – this is why road signs with just figures, such as the silhouette of a deer, are helpful. When it comes to sequential mapping, it could be it makes it easier to predict, for example, that this darker blue region means this part of the bay will be 15 feet deep, given these other two slightly lighter shaded regions were 10 and 5 feet, respectively, in reality. It could be that having systematized icons allows a user to predict that the next time they get to a place on the map with such and such an icon, there will be a freshwater spring there too.

This should instead read:

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> Why might maps tend to make use of sequential patterns as well as iconic representation and the systematization of things like icons and their referents? As I suggested earlier, one answer, or part could be that senders were predisposed to make maps that way for whatever reason. But another answer could be that these ways of making maps make interpretation easier for map users (like us, at least). Iconic interpretation can make things fairly obvious – this is why road signs with just figures, such as the silhouette of a deer, are helpful. When it comes to sequential patterning, it could be it makes it easier to predict, for example, that this darker blue region means this part of the bay will be 15 feet deep, given these other two slightly lighter shaded regions were 10 and 5 feet, respectively, in reality. It could be that having systematized icons allows a user to predict that the next time they get to a place on the map with such and such an icon, there will be a freshwater spring there too.

Page 231. Second paragraph from the bottom reads:

> In these maps, organization matters. And there are systematic mappings—from color to political party, ecoregion, or habitat. Is there room for some sort of sequence? There's room for that too. A map showing the population density of administrative divisions of France, for example, might be such that the darker a region is painted, the denser the population. In the contour map examples, there's a sequence in the way elevations were represented. In the shaded relief maps, there's a sequence in the shading. There are many ways sequences can have a role.

It should instead read:

> In these maps, arrangement matters. And there are systematic mappings—from color to political party, ecoregion, or habitat. Is there room for some sort of sequential pattern? There's room for that too. A map showing the population density of administrative divisions of France, for example, might be such that the darker a region is painted, the denser the population. In the contour map examples, there's a sequential pattern in the way elevations were represented. In the shaded relief maps, there's a sequential pattern in the shading. There are many ways such patterns can have a role.

Pages 233. Second paragraph, lines 4-5 read:

> They are combinatorial, often encoded, and they make use of similarities and sequences.

It should instead read:

> They are combinatorial, often encoded, and they make use of similarities and sequential patterns.

Pages 234-35. Last line on 234 reads:

> And both maps and scores make use of composition and encoding and take advantage of sequences and similarities.

It should instead read:

> And both maps and scores make use of arrangement and encoding and take advantage of sequential patterns and similarities.

Page 237. Last line of the second to last paragraph reads:

> Often, sequences will be used.

It should instead read:

> Often sequential patterns will be used.

Page 238 (#2). Last paragraph, third sentence reads:

> And there is a use of mappings to sequences.

It should instead read:

> And there is a use of sequential mappings.

Page 239. Last full paragraph, third sentence reads:

> Systematic organization and sequencing might matter too – for example, in the circulatory system, bigger veins or arteries might be drawn wider or in dark red.

It should instead read:

> Systematic encoding and sequential patterns might matter too – for example, in the circulatory system, bigger veins or arteries might be drawn wider or in dark red.

Page 240. Lines 1 and 2 read:

> The diameter of the arteries, veins, and veins and capillaries and so on in the diagram, is drawn to map roughly systematically to what we see in the real world.

This is totally ungrammatical and confusing and should instead read:

> The diameters of the arteries, veins, capillaries, and so on in the diagram are drawn to map roughly systematically to what we see in the real world.

Page 240 (#2). Second full paragraph, last 3 lines read:

> What we get with models is that they aren't just combinatorial signals. They're compositional. And they're not just organized but also encoded.

This should instead read:

> What we get with models is that they aren't just compositional signals. They're combinatorial. And they're not just organized but also encoded.

Page 243. Last sentence reads:

> Maps can be *compositional* and *encoded* – just as art can be and just as most paradigm human communication is.

It should instead read:

> Maps can be *combinatorial* and *encoded* – just as art can be and just as most paradigm human communication is.

Page 244. 5th line reads:

> They can be compositional and encoded, make use of mappings and sequences.

It should instead read:

> They can be combinatorial and encoded, make use of systematic mappings and arrangement.

Page 249. Second paragraph. The first word 'Whether' should be 'What'. It is ungrammatical and quite confusing when read. I also had asked for that sentence to be re-written with dashes (or perhaps I edited it that way in the online proofing program and it simply didn't go through – I don't seem to have that detail in my notes). As is, the sentence currently reads:

> Whether we mean going forward by the words *sign, signal, communication* or the like when we talk about some act of communication, some display, or some work of art, whether it's the sender-receiver model way of using those words or some other way, will be up to us.

I believe it should instead read:

> What we mean going forward by the words *sign, signal, communication* or the like when we talk about some act of communication, some display, or some work of art – whether it's the sender-receiver model way of using those words or some other way – will be up to us.

Page 249. Third paragraph. The sentence reads:

> The creation of art and our use of art as a form of communication are one of the great wonders of this world – one of the surprising, utterly strange, totally unnecessary, and yet very welcome features of it.

As is it, this is ungrammatical, confusing, and impedes readability. It should instead read:

> The creation of art and our use of art as a form of communication is one of the great wonders of this world – one of the surprising, utterly strange, totally unnecessary, and yet very welcome features of it.

Page 249. Line 17. There is an occurrence of “likeare” instead of the correct “like are”.

Pages 249-250. The ending quote from *Waking Life* by Linklater starts at the end of page 249 and extends onto page 250. I recall asking the proof editor to put the quote on a separate page. So, in this case, it should be on its own on page 250.

Page 254. References section**.** There is a citation missing from the bibliography that should be added:

> Cao, Rosa. "Putting Representations to Use." *Synthese* 200, no. 2 (2022): 151.